institutions would look rather similar. However, functional pressure does not fully determine the design of regulatory institutions (Thatcher 2002) . Instead, functional pressure is always mediated by historical circumstances at a particular time. In the case of supranational regulatory regimes, it is important whether national regulatory agencies, which might have influenced the paths towards supranational regulatory regimes, already existed.
Risk regulation between negative and positive integration
To abolish non-tariff trade barriers in the Single Market, the member states have generally three opportunities. Firstly, they may recognise each other's product standards (see section 2.1.1). However, this carries the danger of downward regulatory competition, in which the lowest regulatory standards prevail. Secondly, member states may establish harmonised product regulations at the EU level (section 2.1.2). However, here, regulatory policies cannot be passed and implemented by a political centre, but are subject to horizontal coordination between 27 member states. Thirdly, member states may delegate some competencies to supranational bodies to solve this coordination problem (see section 2.1.3). As a result, supranational regulatory regimes emerge in which different actors -scientific or expert bodies, the Commission, comito logy committees and the Council -fulfil different functions.
The single market problem and mutual recognition
Member states face the preference constellation of a prisoner's dilemma when they try to create the Single Market (see the lower part of Figure 2.1; Garrett and Weingast 1993). Accordingly, each member state has to decide whether it will protect its own consumers or industries with trade barriers, or whether it will allow free trade of foreign products. The Single Market emerges if all member states give up the possibility of protectionism and allow free trade of goods throughout the whole community. However, even if they all profit from the establishment of the Single Market, every member state faces incentives to protect its consumers or industries. When other member states allow free trade of goods on their markets, another member state can try to be a free-rider. That is, it can profit from the export of its own goods to foreign markets without carrying the costs of less consumer protection or more competition for its own industry (e.g. member state A tries to achieve point 0/4 in Figure 2 .1). When other member states choose to protect their own
